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Summary findings
Jalan and Ravallion  use propensity-score  matching  percent of them are in the poorest quintile  - reflecting
methods  to estimate  the net income  gains  to families  of  the self-targeting  feature  of the program design.
workers participating  in an Argentinian  workfare  Average gains for men and women are similar, but
program. The methods they propose  are feasible  for  gains are higher for younger  workers.
evaluating  safety  net interventions  in settings  in which  Women's greater  participation  would  not enhance
many  other methods  are not feasible.  The average  gain is  average income gains, and the distribution of gains
about half the gross  wage.  would worsen.
Even  allowing  for forgone  income,  the distribution  of  Greater participation  by the young  would  raise average
gains is decidedly  pro-poor. More than half the  gains  but would also  worsen  the distribution.
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Studies,  London.1.  Introduction
Workfare programs require that participants must work to obtain benefits. 2 They are
often turned to in crises such as due to macroeconomic or agro-climatic shocks, in which a large
number of poor able-bodied people have become unemployed. Typically, the main aim of
workfare is to raise the current incomes of poor families hurt by the crisis.
To assess the impact of such a program, we need to measure the income gain conditional
on income in the absence of the program. The income gain is the difference between household
income with the program and that without it. The "with" data can be collected without great
difficulty. But the "without" data are fundamentally unobserved, since an individual cannot be
both a participant and a non-participant of the same program. Common practice has been to
estimate the gains by the gross wages paid. 3 In other words, the unobserved income without the
program is taken to be equal to income with the program, minus wages received.
This assumption would be a reasonable one if labor supply to a workfare program came
only from the unemployed. But that is difficult to accept. Even if a participating worker was
unemployed at the time she joined the program, that does not mean that she would have
remained unemployed had the program not existed. Even a worker who has been unemployed
for some time will typically face a positive probability of finding extra work during a period of
search, including self-employment in an informal sector activity. Joining the program will leave
less time for search. There are also ways in which behavioral responses help reduce foregone
income.  There are likely to be effects on time allocation within the household. For example,
2  On the arguments  and evidence  on this class of interventions  see Ravallion  (1991, 1999a),  Besley  and
Coate  (1992),  Lipton  and Ravallion  (1995),  Mukherjee  (1997),  and Subbarao  (1997).
3  See, for example,  the various  assessments  of the cost-effectiveness  of workfare  programs  reviewed  in
Subbarao  et al., (1997).
2Datt and Ravallion (1994) find that other family members took up the displaced productive
activities when someone  joined a workfare program in rural India. Such behavioral responses
will reduce foregone income, though we can still expect it to be positive.
This paper estimates the income gains from a workfare program and how those gains
vary with pre-intervention incomes. We study the Trabajar Program instituted by the
Government of Argentina, and supported by a World Bank loan and technical assistance.  We
use propensity-score matching methods (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1985; Heckman et al.,
1997, 1998)  to draw a comparison group to workfare participants from a larger survey of non-
participants. A number of features of this setting lend themselves to matching methods. It was
possible to assure that the same questionnaire  was administered to both the participants and the
non-participants, and that both groups were from the same economic environment. The Trabajar
participant could be identified in the larger survey. 4 Furthermore, using kernel density
estimation techniques, we are able to ensure that participants are matched with the non-
participants over a common region of the matching variables. Any remaining bias in the
matching estimator can thus be attributed to unobserved characteristics. The design of the
program can be expected to entail considerable rationing of participation according to
observables; the sample of non-participants is very likely to include people who wanted to
participate but were unable to do so due to say non-availability of the program. While our
application is well suited to matching methods, bias due to unobservables cannot be ruled out by
matching alone, since the method is basecl  solely on observables. So we also propose and
implement a test for any remaining selectivity bias after matching.
4  The researcher  may not be able  to identify  whether  an individual  participated  in the program  or not in
the larger  population  sample. In such  cases,  one can still go ahead  with  the matching  procedure  though
this adds a "contamination  bias" to the impact  estimator. In our application  this is not an issue.
3The following section discusses the evaluation problem and our methods. Section 3
describes the Trabajar program. Our data are described in Section 4.  Section 5 presents the
results, and offers an economic interpretation. Section 6 concludes.
2.  Estimating the Income Gains from Workfare
In assessing the gains from a workfare program, the workers' earnings are naturally the
main focus, and that will be the case here.  However, it should be noted that earnings net of
foregone income are only one of the potential benefits. There could also be risk benefits from
knowing that the program exists.  There may well also be benefits from the outputs, depending
on (amongst other things) how well targeted the workfare projects are to poor areas. 5
We first outline what we see as the model of self-targeting underlying arguments for
workfare, pointing to the key role played by foregone incomes. We then describe the matching
method we use to estimate foregone incomes.
2.1  The Problem
The following rudimentary model has the essential features necessary to characterize the
"self-targeting" argument often made in favor of workfare (Ravallion, 1991). The model
assumes that foregone income from accepting a workfare job is F(Y), a smoothly increasing
function of pre-intervention income Y(scaled to lie between zero and one). Foregone income
increases with pre-intervention income due to differences in education, experience and so on that
are naturally correlated with both earnings and family income. The workfare program offers a
wage W, with F(O)<W<F(l). Workers only care about the net wage gain (i.e., the work
alternatives are judged to be the same in other respects).
S  This issue is examnined  further  in Ravallion  (1999b),  which  presents  results on poor-area  targeting  for
the sarne  program  studied  here.
4It is evident that under these assumptions, only those workers with pre-intervention
income less than F-1(W) will participate; the program will perfectly screen "poor" (Y<F-'(W))
from "non-poor" (Y>F-'(W)). The schedule of gains is G=W-F(Y)  for Y<F- 1 ()  and G=O  for
Y>F-'(W), yielding post-intervention incomes Y+G.
In this simple model, underestimating the foregone income will lead the evaluator to
overestimate the impact on poverty. To see why, suppose that, in assessing the gains from the
program, we use a biased estimate of foregone income, namely O(A$<F(Y)  for all Y.  Then we
will overestimate the gains for all Yup to  5 -'(W). The distribution of incomes under the biased
estimate of foregone incomes must first-order dominate the actual distribution. So the error in
assessing foregone incomes will overestimate the impact on income poverty. 6
This model also suggests that in the extreme-though  commonly assumed-case  in
which the foregone income is  zero, a workfare program would make little sense as a means of
reaching the poor.  There will be no self-targeting mechanism, and the government would have
to rely on some form of indicator targeting or means test. So using the program wage to measure
the income gain is antithetical to the logic of a workfare program as a means of self-targeting.
How can one estimate the foregone income? This is a counterfactual concept in that
participants' incomes in the absence of the program cannot be data. There are several methods
one might adopt to assess the counter-factual, drawing on the literature on impact evaluation.
One can do reflexive comparisons by collecting baseline data on probable (eligible) participants
before the program was instituted. These data are then compared with data on the same
individuals once they have actually participated in the program. In this case, the counterfactual
group is the set of participating individuals themselves, but observed before the program is
6  This holds for a broad-class  of poverty  measures  (Atkinson,  1987).
5actually implemented. This method can be extended to include observations on non-participants,
before and after the intervention, allowing a "double-difference" estimate of the program's
impact. Alternatively, potential participants are identified and data are collected from them.
However, only a random sub-sample of these individuals is actually allowed to participate in the
program. The identified participants who do not actually participate in the program (the
"randomized out" group) form the counterfactual in this case.
Another possible approach is to use propensity-score matching methods, following
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985) and Heckman et al. (1997, 1998). Here, the counterfactual
group is constructed by matching program participants to non-participants from a larger survey
such as the population census or an annual national budget survey. The matches are chosen on
the basis of similarities in observed characteristics.
Each of these methods has both strengths and weaknesses. For example, reflexive and
double-difference comparisons raise concerns about attrition, whereby a non-random subset of
the baseline sample drops out for various reasons. Randomization is ideal in theory, since the
comparison group has the same expected distribution of characteristics as the treatment group in
the absence of the intervention. However, randomization is not often feasible, and there can also
be problems of selective non-participation amongst those randomly chosen for the program. Both
baseline survey methods and randomization also require that the evaluation is set up prior to the
program. This is unlikely to be feasible in crisis situations. A government concerned about the
social impact of a macroeconomic or agro-climatic crisis is not likely to agree to wait for the
evaluation to be put in place.
Matching methods can avoid these problems, though they create their own. An advantage
is that, since most countries now have a nationally representative socio-economic survey
instrument, the marginal cost of using matching methods only includes the survey of program
6participants. The same survey instrument can then be taken to a sample of participants after the
program has started, possibly with an extra module to cover specific questions related to the
program. Matching estimates will be reliable if: (i) participants and controls have the same
distribution of unobserved characteristics; failure of this condition to hold is often referred to as
the "selection" problem in econometrics; (ii) they have the same distribution of observed
characteristics; (iii) the same questionnaire is administered to both groups; and (iv) participants
and controls are from the same economic environment. In the absence of these features, the
difference between the mean eamings of the participants in a social program and the matched
non-participants will be a biased estimate of the mean impact of the program.
2.2  Method of Estimating the Gains  from Workfare
Suppose we have data on N participants in a workfare program, and another random
sample of size rN (r>l) from the population.  The second set of data might be the national
population census or an annual national household budget survey that has information relevant in
the participation decisions of the individuals. Using the two sets of data, we try to match the N
program participants with a comparison group of non-participants from the population.
The two surveys must include infonnation that helps predict participation in the program.
LetXbe  the vector of such variables. Ideally, one would match a participant with a non-
participant using the entire dimension of X,  i.e., a match is only declared if there are two
individuals, one in each of the two samples, for whom the value of Xis  identical.  This is
impractical, however, because the dimensicin  of X could be very high.  Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) show that matching can be performed conditioning on P(A) alone rather than onX, where
P(X) = Prob(D=I1 X) is the probability of participating conditional onX, the "propensity score"
of X. If outcomes without the intervention are independent of participation given Xthen  they are
7also independent of participation given P(X). This is a powerful result, since it reduces a
potentially high-dimensional matching problem to a single dimensional problem.
The propensity score is calculated for each observation in the participant and the
comparison-group samples using standard logit models. 7 Choice-based sampling methods
suggested by Manski and Lerman (1978) can be used to weight the observations given that there
is over-sampling of participants. In our case however, we do not know the sampling weights to
do the choice-based sample re-weighting. But we can still carry out the matching using the odds
ratio pi = P/( 1  -Pi) where Pi is the estimated probability of participation for individual i. Using the
propensity score, one constructs matched-pairs on the basis of how close the scores are across the
two samples. The nearest neighbor to the i'th participant is defined as the non-participant that
minimizes [p(Xj)-p(X)  )]2  over allj in the set of non-participants, where p(Xk) is the predicted
odds ratio for observation k.
In their comparisons of non-experimental methods of evaluating a training program with
a benchmark experimental design, Heckman et. al (1997, 1998) find that failure to compare
participants and controls at common values of matching variables is the single most important
source of bias - considerably more important than the classic econometric problem of selection
bias due to differences in unobervables. To ensure that we are matching only over common
values of the propensity scores, we estimated the density of the scores for the non-participants at
100 points over the range of scores. We use a biweight kernel density estimator and the optimal
bandwidth value suggested by Silverman (1986). Once we estimate the density for the non-
'  One  could  use semi-  and non-parametric  methods  to estimate  the propensity  scores  though  Todd (1995)
argues  that such methods  do not make any difference  to the impact  estimator.  Thus for computational
simplicity,  we use standard  parametric  likelihood  methods  to compute  the estimated  propensity  scores.
8participants, we exclude those non-participEnts  for whom the estimated density is equal to zero.
We also exclude 2% of the sample from the top and bottom of the non-participant distribution.
The mean impact estimator of the program is given by:
P  NP
II  Yj  E W9jYV()  /P  (1)
j=p  i=l
where Yjl is the post-intervention household income of participantj, Yyo  is the household income
of the ith  non-participant matched to thejth participant, P is the total number of participants, NP
the total number of non-participants and the Wy's are the weights applied in calculating the
average income of the matched non-participants. There  are several different types of parametric
and non-parametric weights that one can use.  In this paper we use three different weights and
thereby report three different matching estimators. Our first matching estimator is the "nearest
neighbor" estimator where we find the closest non-participant match for each participant and the
impact estimator is a simple mean over the income difference between the participant and its
matched non-participant. 8'9 Our second estimator takes the average income of the closest five
matched non-participants and compares this to the participant's income. We also report a kernel-
weighted estimator where the weight are given by:
P
Wij  = Kuj 1  K,0  (2)
j=l
where
K=  K[(P(X,)  - .P(Xj ))  / a, 0 ]  (3)
E  K[(P(Xi )  -P(Xj  ))/aNo  ]
j=1
s The  closest  match is chosen  by the distance  metric  discussed  above.  Also  we allow  for replacement  of
the non-participants,  so a non-participant  could  be the closest  match for more  than one  participant.
9and where aNo  is the bandwidth parameter, K(.) is the kernel as a function of the difference in the
propensity scores of the participants and the non-participants. In our analysis, we have used
Silverman's (1986) optimal bandwidth parameter and a biweight kernel function.  (The results
were very similar using either a rectangular or parzen kernel function.)
Lastly, in each of these cases, the associated standard errors of the mean impact estimator
are also calculated. We calculated both the parametric and bootstrapped standard errors for the
impact estimators.  The two were virtually identical.  We report the parametric standard errors in
the paper.  (The bootstrapped standard errors are available from the authors on request.)
2.3  Testingfor Bias due to Unobservables
The matching estimate described above will give a biased estimate of the income gains
from workfare if there are unobserved variables that jointly influence incomes and workfare
participation, conditional on the observed variables in the data used for matching.
A natural test for such a bias is look for a partial correlation between incomes and the
residuals from the participation model (used to construct the propensity scores) controlling for
actual participation. We call this the test for selection bias in the matching estimator. It is a
straightforward application of the standard Sargan-Wu-Hausman  test.  There will, of course, also
be heterogeneity in other characteristics relevant to incomes. By performing the test for
selection bias on a sample combining the participants and their matched non-participants we will
have already eliminated some of this heterogeneity. One can also explicitly introduce a vector of
control variables (Z) to give a test equation for income Y  of the form:
Y1 =  a +  ±/P  + vRi  + bZ6  +  v,  (4)
In calculating  our mean  impact,  if the income  of the participant  is less than the income  of the matched
non-participant,  we treat the impact  to be zero  rather  than the observed  negative  number.
10for household i in the combined participant and matched control sample of nearest neighbors,
where Ri denotes the residuals from the paiticipation model. Selection bias is indicated if we
can reject the null that y=O. In a linear model, identification requires the usual condition that
there is at least one variable in X that is not in Z.  The non-linearity of the propensity scores in X
means that this condition is not essential. 1Iowever, specifics of the program's design (discussed
below) will provide a seemingly plausible exclusion restriction allowing identification without
relying solely on the non-linearity.
We can use this method to test for selection bias only in the nearest neighbor case where
there is one matched non-participant for each participant.  In the other two cases, it does not
appear to be possible to use a regression to replicate the complex weighting of the data on non-
participants used in forming the matching estimator.
3.  The Trabajar Program
Argentina experienced a sharp increase in unemployment in mid 1  990s, reaching 18% in
1996/97. This was clearly hurting the poor; for example, the unemployment rate (on a
comparable basis) was 39% amongst the poorest decile in terms of household income per capita
in Greater Buenos Aires. Unemployment rates fell steadily as income per person increases.  ' 0
With financial and technical suppoIt from the World Bank, the Government of Argentina
introduced the Trabajar II program in May 1997. This is a greatly expanded and reformed
version of a previous program, Trabajar I. The program aimed to help in two ways.  Firstly, by
providing short-term work at relatively low wages, the program aimed to self-select unemployed
workers from poor families.  Secondly, the scheme tried to locate socially useful projects in poor
10  These  data are from  the Permanent  Household  Survey  (EPH)  for Greater  Buenos  Aires  in May 1996.
11areas to help repair and develop local infrastructure. This paper only assesses progress against
the first objective (on the second see Ravallion, 1999b).
The national program budget is allocated across provinces by the center, leaving the
provincial governments with considerable power to determine how the moneys are allocated
within the province. There is evidence of horizontal inequality in the outcomes of this process, in
that equally poor local areas ("departments") obtained very different allocations in expectation
from the program depending on which province they belong (Ravallion, 1999b). This
decentralized nature of the program is the basis of our identification strategy in testing for
selectivity bias. Following Ravallion and Wodon (1998) we use province dummy variables as the
instruments. Clearly the province of residence matters to participation given the way program
funds are allocated.  We then assume that province of residence does not matter to incomes
independently of participation. Given that we will include a wide range of local geographic
control variables in the income regression this assumption is defensible.
The projects are proposed by local governmental and non-governmental organizations
who must cover the non-wage costs. The projects have to be viable by a range of criteria, and
are given priority according to ex ante assessments of how well targeted they are to poor areas,
what benefits they are likely to bring to the local community, and how much the area has already
received from the program. Workers cannot join the program unless they are recruited to a
project proposal that is accepted on the basis of these criteria. The process of proposing suitable
sub-projects is thus key to worker participation in the program. There are other factors. The
workers cannot be receiving unemployment benefits or be participating in any other employment
or training program. It is unlikely that a temporary employment program such as this would
affect residential location, though workers can commute.
12The wage rate is set at a maximum of $200 per month. This was chosen to be low
enough to assure good targeting performance, and to help assure workers would take up regular
work when it became available.  To help locate the Trabajar wage in the overall distribution of
wages we examined earnings of the poorest 10% of households (ranked by total income per
person) in Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) in the May 1996 Permanent Household Survey. For this
group, the average monthly earnings for the principal job (when this entails at least 35 hours of
work per week) in May 1996 was $263.11 (As expected, the poorest decile also received the
lowest average wage, and average wages rose monotonically with household income per person.)
So the Trabajar wage is clearly at the low end of the earnings distribution.
There are two further concerns about the project that the evaluation can throw light on.
One concern has been the low level of female participation; only 15% of participating workers in
the first six months were female. The key iquestion  is why.  If it is because women choose not to
participate then one would be less concerned than if it arose from impediments to their
participation due to discrimination in allocating Trabajar  jobs.  If there is such a gender bias then
there will be unexploited welfare gains from higher female participation. We cannot measure the
welfare gain, but we can determine whether the net income gain is higher for women then men,
implying an income loss from low female participation.
Secondly, while Trabajar I had been targeted to middle aged heads of households, it was
decided not to impose this restriction on the new program since it risked adding to the forgone
income of participants by constraining their ability to adjust work allocation within the
household in response to the program. However, the past practice under Trabajar I may still
I  l  This includes  domestic  servants. This is ani  unusual  labor-market  group,  given  that they  often have
extra income-in-kind.  If one excludes  them,  the figure  is $334.
13have influenced local implementation of the new program. Then one might expect to find that
there are unexploited income gains by increasing participation by the young.  We will test this.
4.  Data
Two household surveys are used. One is of program participants and the other is a
national sample survey, used to obtain the comparison group. Both surveys were done by the
government's statistics office, the Instituto Nacional De Estadistica Y Census (INDEC), using
the same questionnaire, the same interviewing teams and at approximately the same time.
The national survey is the Encuesta de Desarrollo Social (EDS), a large socio-economic
survey done in mid-1997. The EDS sample covers the population residing in localities with
5,000 or more residents.  The comparison group is constructed from the EDS. According to the
1991 census, such localities totaled to 420 in Argentina and represented 96% of the urban
population and 84% of the total population.  114 localities were sampled.
The second data set is a special purpose sample of Trabajar participants done for the
purpose of this evaluation. The sample design involved a number of steps. First among all the
projects approved between April and June of 1997, 300 projects in localities which were in the
EDS sample frame were randomly selected, with an additional 50 projects chosen for
replacement purposes. The administrative records on project participants did not include
addresses, so Ministry of Labor (MOL) had to obtain these by field work. From these 350
projects, the Labor Ministry could find the addresses of nearly 4,500 participants. However, for
various reasons about 1,000 of these were not interviewed. The reasons given by INDEC were
that the addresses were found to be outside the sample frame, or they were incomplete, or even
non-existent, or that all household members were absent when the interviewer went to interview
14the household, or that they did not want to respond. In all 3,500 participant households were
surveyed. (The number of Trabajar participants during May 1997-January 1998 was 65,321.)
We restrict the analysis to households with complete income information, and those who
completed all the questions asked of them.  Also, we only consider participants who were
actually working in a Trabajar project at the time they were surveyed.  Since the EDS
questionnaire does not ask income-related questions to those below 15 or  above 64 years of age,
we also had to restrict our attention to the age group 15-64 years for our analysis.  We focus on
current Trabajar participants in the reference week, fixed at the first week of September 1997,
who received wages from the Trabajar program during August 1997. 80% of the Trabajar
sample had current participants by this definition.1 2 With these restrictions, the total number of
active participants that we have used is 2,802.
5.  Results and Interpretation
5.1  Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1, we present selected descriptive statistics for the Trabajar and EDS samples.
The Trabajar sample has lower average income, higher average family size, are more likely to
have borrowed to meet their basic needs, receive less from informal sources, are more likely to
participate in some form of political organlization,  and less likely to own various consumer
durables (with the exception of a color TVJ,  which appears to be a necessity of life in Argentina.)
Table 2 gives the percentage distribution of Trabajar participants' families across deciles
formed from the EDS with households ranked by income per capita, excluding income from
Trabajar. (The poorest decile is split in half.) This is the type of tabulation that is typically made
12  The remaining  20% of the participants  are assumed  to be beneficiaries  of the program  that had left
work  by August  1st,  1997  (i.e. at the start of the survey),  or had not yet started  the Trabajar  job.
15in assessing such a program. It assumes zero foregone income, so each participating family's
pre-intervention income is simply actual income minus wage earnings from the program.
Table 2 suggests that a high proportion of the families of participants come from poor
families. 13 40% of the program participants have a household income per capita which puts them
in the poorest 5% of the national population; 60% of participants are drawn from the poorest
10% nationally.  By most methods of measuring poverty in Argentina, the poverty rate is about
20%. So 75-85% of the participants are poor by this standard. Such targeting performance is
very good by international standards.
Does relaxing the assumption of zero foregone income change the results in Table 1?
Using the matching methods described above, we will now see whether that assumption is
justified, and how much it matters to an assessment of average gains and their incidence.
5.2  Propensity-Score Matching Estimates
Table 3 presents the logit regression used to estimate the propensity scores on the basis of
which the matching is subsequently done. The results accord well with expectations from the
simple averages in Table 1. Trabajar participants are clearly poorer, as indicated by their
housing, neighborhood, schooling, and their subjective perceptions of welfare and expected
future prospects (relative to their parents). The participation regression suggests that program
participants are more likely to be males who are head of households and married.  Participants
are likely to be longer-term residents of the locality rather than migrants from other areas. The
model also predicts that (controlling for other characteristics) Trabajar participants are more
13 We have only considered  participants  who  have earned  at least  $150  from participating  in the Trabajar
job while  calculating  the impact  of the project. The minimum  wage offered  under Trabajar  is $200;  those
reporting  less than $150  as their Trabajar  earnings  imply  that these  participants  are in their last  phase of
their Trabajar  job and or have  misreported  their income.  Since  we are interested  in the impact  on currently
active  participants  in the program,  we excluded  the observations  to get  a better  albeit  a more  conservative
measure  of the impact.
16likely to be members of political parties and neighborhood associations. This is not surprising
given the design of the program, since social and political connections will no doubt influence
the likelihood of being recruited into a succ;essful  sub-project proposal. However, participation
rates in political parties and local groups are still low, even for Trabajar participants (Table 1).
Based on Table 3, the mean propensity score for the national sample is 0.075 (with a
standard deviation of 0.125). This is of couirse  much lower than the mean score for the Trabajar
sample, which is of 0.405 (0.266). However, after following the matching method outlined in
section 2.2, the comparison group of nearest neighbors drawn from the national sample has a
mean score of 0.394 (0.253), very close to that of the Trabajar sample.
Tables 4 and 5 give our estimates of average income gains, and their incidence according
to pre-intervention incomes. For this purpose we have first estimated the gain for each
participating household, by each of the thre  e methods described in section 2.2. We then assign
each household to a decile using the same decile bounds calibrated from the EDS, but this time
the participants are assigned to the decile implied by their estimated pre-intervention income as
given by actual income minus the estimated net gain.
The nearest neighbor estimate of the average gain is $157, about three-quarters of the
Trabajar wage. The nearest five and non-parametric estimator give appreciably lower gains, of
around $100. Since the latter estimates use more information and are presumably more robust we
will use them in preference to the nearest neighbor estimate. For computational convenience and
to circumvent the small sample problem in the sub-group cases, the rest of the paper is based on
the "nearest five" rather than the non-parametric estimate.
The average gain using the "nearest five" estimator of $103 is about half of the average
Trabajar wage.  Given that there is  sizable foregone income, the crude incidence numbers in
Table 1 overestimate how pro-poor the program is, since pre-intervention income is lower than is
17implied by the net gains. Where this bias is most notable is amongst the poorest 5%; while the
non-behavioral incidence analysis suggests that 40% of participant households are in the poorest
5%, the estimate factoring in foregone incomes is much lower at 10%. Nonetheless, over half of
the participant households are in the poorest decile nationally even allowing for foregone
incomes.  Given that the poverty rate in Argentina is widely reckoned to be 20%, our results
suggest that four out of five Trabaj  ar participants are poor by Argentinean standards.
Figure 1 gives mean income gain at each level of pre-intervention income, estimated by a
locally-weighted smoothed scatter plot of the data.  Gains fall sharply (though not continuously)
up to an income of about $200 per person per month (which is about the median of the national
distribution), and are roughly constant after that.  We will return later to interpret this finding.
Figure 2 gives the empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) implied by our
results.  We give the CDFs for both the Trabajar participants and the national distribution. We
also give the counter-factual (pre-intervention) CDF for the Trabajar participants.  There is a
spike of zero incomes in the national sample, much of which is probably measurement error.  If
one takes this spike out there is first-order dominance comparing the Trabajar samples and the
national samples, with higher poverty in the Trabajar sample at all possible poverty lines. There
is automatically first-order dominance of the post-intervention incomes for the Trabajar sample
given that we have ruled out negative gains on a priori grounds.
The absolute gains are highest for the third decile, but do not vary greatly across the
deciles containing participants. The percentage net gains are highest for the poorest, reaching
74% for the poorest 5%. In section 5.3 we will offer an interpretation of these findings.
Tables 7-9 report the net wage gains for three different demographic groups: female
participants, participants between the ages 15-24 years (typically identified as those who are new
entrants into the job market), and workers in the age group 25-64 years.
18The estimates in Table 7 are not consistent with the existence of income losses due to a
gender bias in the program. The net wage gains from the program accruing to female participants
are virtually identical to the gains for male participants. However, the distribution of female
participation is less pro-poor, as indicated by household income per capita; while over half of the
members of participating families are in the poorest decile nationally, this is true of less than
40% of the members of female participants' families. This probably reflects lower wages for
women in other work, making the Trabajar wage more attractive to the non-poor.
For the younger cohort however, the net gains are significantly higher (comparing Tables
8 and 9). Foregone incomes are lower for the young, probably reflecting their lack of experience
in the labor market. Because of this, there wculd be income gains from higher participation by
the young. (To the extent that any young participants leave school to join the program, future
incomes may suffer.)  This suggests that the older workers may well be favored in rationing
Trabajar jobs. However, the distribution of gains is more pro-poor for the older workers, with
almost 60% coming from the poorest decile. Pushing for higher participation by the young
entails a short-term trade-off between average gains and a better distribution. It may also entail a
longer-term trade off with future incomes of the young, by reducing schooling.
Finally we test whether our impact estimator is biased due to selection on unobservables.
For identification, we exclude the province dummy variables from the set of controls in the
income regression, as discussed in section 3. The regression coefficient on participation (,  in
equation 4) was 154.358 (t=5.049) which is very close to the matching estimate for the nearest
neighbor case.  1
4 The coefficient on the residuals from the participation regression (y in equation
14  Of course,  if one drops  the control  variables  and the participation  residuals  then the estimate  is
identical  to that based on the mean  differences  between  the participants  and their nearest  neighbors.
194) was 4.064 but this was not significantly different from zero (t=0.402). Evidently, selection
bias on unobservables is not an important concern in our matching estimates.
5.3  Economic Interpretation
Although we find that program participation falls off sharply as household income rises,
the net gains conditional on participation do not fall amongst the upper half of the income
distribution (Figure 1). Since the program wage rate is about the same for all participants,
foregone income amongst participants appears to be independent of family income above about
$200 per person per month.  This may be surprising at first sight. The standard model of self-
targeting through work requirements postulates that foregone income tends to be higher for
higher income groups (section 2.1).
We can offer the following explanation. The Trabajar wage is almost certainly too low to
attract a worker out of a regular job. For a worker with such a job, let the foregone income from
joining the program befe(Y)>  W where (as in section 2.1) Y is the pre-intervention income of the
worker's household, Wis the wage rate offered on the Trabajar program and the functionfe is
strictly increasing.
For an unemployed worker, however, only miscellaneous odd-jobs are available.  Anyone
can get this work, and it does not earn any more for someone from a well-off family than a poor
one. Let this "odd-job" foregone income bef,<W and assume thatf,  is independent of Y  Let the
rate of unemployment be U and assume that this is a decreasing function of Y;  that is also
consistent with the evidence for this setting (section 3). Average foregone income if one joins the
Trabajar program is then:
F(Y) U(Y)fu +  [l-U(1) fe(Y)  (5)
This is strictly increasing in Y, as in the standard model of self-targeting (section 2.1).
20In this model, unemployed workers will want to participate in the Trabajar program,
while the employed will not be interested in participating (assuming that the altemative work is
judged equal in other respects, although this can be relaxed without altering the main point of
this model.)  The program will successfully screen the two groups. We will see a fall in Trabajar
participation as income rises, as in Table 4.  However, when we calculate the foregone income of
actual participants we will getf, not F(Y). Measured net gains amongst actual participants will
not vary systematically with pre-intervention income, even though self-targeting of the poor is
excellent. Our finding that foregone income conditional on participation does not fall as income
rises amongst the upper half of the distribution is still consistent with good overall targeting
through self-selection.
6.  Conclusions
The assumptions made in program evaluations are often dictated by data availability. In
assessing the gains from workfare programs it is common to only have access to a single cross-
sectional survey. However, the assumption that the forgone income of participants is zero can
still be tested with such data. Propensity-score matching methods of evaluation combine a single
cross-sectional survey of program participants with a comparable larger cross-sectional survey
from which a comparison group is chosen. Wiith  sufficiently detailed cross-sectional data on both
participants and non-participants, these methods can allow an assessment of behavioral responses
without pre-intervention baseline data or randomization. The accuracy of this method will
depend on how well one can assure that trealment and comparison groups come from the same
economic environment and were given the same survey instrument. The method cannot rule out
the possibility of selection bias due to unobserved differences between participants and even a
well-matched comparison group, though there is some evidence this may well be an over-rated
21problem (Heckman, et al., 1998). We have applied recent advances in matching methods to
Argentina's Trabajar Program. While neither a baseline survey nor randomization were feasible
options in this case, the program is well suited to matching methods. We have also offered an
over-identification test for selectivity bias after matching.
We find that program participants are more likely to be poor than non-participants by a
variety of both objective and subjective indicators. The participants tend to be less well educated,
they tend to live in poorer neighborhoods, and they tend to be members of neighborhood
associations and political parties. The relatively low wage rate clearly makes the program
unattractive to the non-poor.
Using our model of program participation to find the best matches from the national
sample for each Trabajar worker, we have estimated the net income gain from the program. We
find that ignoring foregone incomes greatly overstates the average gains from the program,
though sizable gains of about half the gross wage are still found. Even allowing for foregone
incomes, the distribution of the gains is decidedly pro-poor, reflecting the self-targeting feature
of the programs' design. Average gains are very similar between men and women, but are higher
for younger workers. Higher female participation would not enhance average income gains, and
the distribution of the gains would worsen. Higher participation by the young would raise
average gains, but also worsen the distribution. After matching, our tests suggest that selectivity
bias (due to unobservables) is a negligible problem.
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24Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Trabajar sample  National sample
Per capita income ($/personimonth)  73.205  366.596
(101.843)  (792.033)
Average household size  4.894  3.448
(2.509)  (1.981)
Private pensions ($/person/month)  10.821  18.927
(36.106)  (67.813)
Social pensions ($/person/month)  1.250  0.749
(6.719)  (6.896)
Help from friends and relatives ($/person/month)  1.515  11.893
(16.013)  (71.977)
% of households who need to borrow to meet basic  32.777  18.820
needs  (0.887)  (0.263)
% of population participating in some form of political  2.910  1.450
organization  (0.318)  (0.009)
% of households who own a telephone  22.660  66.150
(0.791)  (0.318)
% of households who own a color TV  75.600  77.040
(0.811)  (0.283)
% of households owning a refrigerator with inbuilt  26.450  48.280
freezer  (0.833)  (0.336)
% of households owning an automatic washing  11.660  37.680
machine  (0.606)  (0.326)
Male  Female  Male  Female
Average age at which currently active household  15.945  17.809  15.658  17.689
members started working (years)  (9.716)  (9.683)  (6.193)  (6.772)
Average age at which those household members who  15.333  15.455  16.857  16.789
are no longer at school dropped out of school (years)  (8.137)  (8.813)  (8.649)  (7.1306)
% of people in household who were unwell (accident  19.030  23.260  22.130  26.700
or sick) in the last month  (0.742)  (0.798)  (0.279)  (0.298)
Notes:  Above averages are population-weighted averages. Monetary units are in $/month, 1997 prices.
Standard  deviations  are reported  in the parenatheses.
25Table 2: Location of Trabajar participants in the national distribution of household income
per capita
Trabajar sample  National sample
Households  Persons  Households  Persons
Poorest 5%  40.2  38.8  5.0  5.6
Next 5%  18.0  21.3  5.0  7.8
Decile 2  17.5  18.5  10.0  13.1
Decile 3  9.9  9.5  10.0  11.7
Decile 4  6.8  5.8  10.0  10.9
Decile 5  2.2  1.9  10.0  9.7
Decile 6  2.5  1.6  10.0  9.1
Decile 7  1.7  1.6  10.0  9.2
Decile 8  0.6  0.5  10.0  8.2
Decile 9  0.4  0.3  10.0  7.9
Decile 10  0.2  0.1  10.1  6.7
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
26Table 3: Logit regression of participation in the Trabajar Program
Coefficient  t-ratio
Cordoba  3.5084  8.395
Chaco  1.0953  2.750
La Pampa  1.2023  3.053
LaRioja  3.1152  7.505
Misiones  1.4492  3.630
Neuquen  1.0367  2.597
Salta  1.3164  3.332
San Juan  1.4462  3.513
Santa  Fe  1.5063  3.897
Santiago  del Estero  1.4058  3.572
Whether  household  is located  in an emergency  town  -0.5455  -3.284
......  a settlement  of 5+  years  -0.9622  -3.998
......  a social  housing  area  0.3536  4.479
......  an area in very damaged  condition  -0.3197  -2.747
Dwelling  has I room  (beside  bathroom/kitchen)  0.7733  7.654
......  2 rooms  0.5247  6.805
......  3 rooms  0.2734  3.902
Main material  of interior  floors is cement/bricks  0.3028  2.579
Water is obtained  from manual  pumps  -0.9468  -2.902
Water shortages  in last 12  months  -0.2707  -4.535
Portable  gas is used  for cooking  -0.5661  -2.807
Household  gets hot water  through  a central  heating  service  0.6968  2.444
Located  <3 blocks  from a place  where  trash is placed  habitually  -0.3360  -5.015
......  <3 blocks from a place which  gets flooded  0.2218  3.284
......  in an area  where there is daily collection  of trash  0.1795  2.016
......  in an area with a water  network  0.7348  4.396
......  in an area with sewer  network  0.2779  4.073
......  <5 blocks  from closest  public  transportation  -0.2674  -2.202
......  <5 blocks  from closest  public  phone  -0.3044  -3.109
......  <5 blocks  from closest  public  primary  schc,ol  -0.4211  -4.419
......  5-9 blocks  from closest  public  primary  school  -0.3027  -3.180
......  <5 blocks from  closest  neighborhood  healthn  center  0.1675  2.309
......  5-9 blocks  from closest  neighborhood  healih center  0.1678  2.315
......  <5 blocks from  closest  pharmacy  -0.4265  -5.129
......  <5 blocks from  closest  mail  -0.2709  -2.655
......  < 10 blocks  from a secondary  school  -1.0198  -4.231
......  10-30  blocks from  a secondary  school  -1.0127  -4.253
......  30-50 blocks from a secondary  school  -0.4955  -1.954
......  <10 blocks  from a public  hospital  -0.3943  -3.325
Safety  is the major  concern  in the neighborhood  0.2708  2.917
27It is a dangerous street for pedestrians to cross  0.1472  2.040
Shortages of electricity  0.2925  3.084
Drug addiction problem in neighborhood  0.3855  -3.786
Male  2.2307  13.961
Head of the household  0.3169  2.735
Spouse of the household head  -0.6185  -3.858
Legally married  0.2211  2.343
Separated after being married  0.4397  2.911
Divorced  0.3769  2.202
During last 12 months has been absent from h'hold for > 1 month  -0.4450  -3.182
Born in this locality  0.8215  5.019
...... in another locality of same province  0.5672  3.373
.......  in another province  0.6523  3.867
Lived habitually in this locality for last 5 years  0.5326  4.876
Affiliated to a health system only through social work  -0.6388  -7.750
.......  to a health system through unions and private hospital  -0.4694  -3.839
.......  to health system through social work & mutual benefit society  -1.0715  -3.291
.......  to health system because he is a worker  -1.1213  -6.530
Currently attends an educational establishment for primary/sec school  -0.7551  -2.117
Currently a student at tertiary school  0.8775  2.650
Dropped out of school because found syllabus uninteresting  -0.5386  -3.656
.....  he/she was finding school difficult  0.6700  3.048
.....  location of school was inconvenient  -0.3996  -1.951
Dropped out of school for personal reasons  0.3671  2.100
Taken a course in labor training in the last 3 years  0.4252  5.244
Never a member of a sports association  0.3444  2.826
Regular member of a neighborhood association with some admin.  0.9705  2.482
Responsibilities
Regular member of a neighborhood association with no responsibilities  0.8259  2.526
Never a member of union/student association  0.5973  2.413
Member of a political party with some administrative responsibilities  0.7523  1.900
Member of a political party  1.6387  6.020
Occasional member of a political party  1.3609  5.041
Thinks that 20 years hence, economic situation will be the same as parents now 0.3981  5.401
Reason for above is lack of schooling  -0.3705  -5.632
Reason for above is economic situation of country  -0.7596  -7.291
Thinks that he and his family is very poor  0.5976  6.078
Children born in the last 12 months  0.2281  2.693
Pregnant currently  -0.9295  -2.435
Constant  -5.6210  -4.390
Log Likelihood  -5580
Notes: Only significant coefficients in the logit regression are reported in the above table. For
omitted categories and for other variables included in the regression see Addendum (available
from the authors).
28Table 4: Net income gains from the program using different estimators
Groups  Nearest neighbor  Nearest five estimator  Non-parametric estimator
Full sample  156.770  102.627  91.678
(296.083)  (247.433)  (230.327)
Ventile 1  372.010  108.543  107.862
(409.053)  (210.543)  (222.831)
Ventile 2  132.662  83.351  63.331
(260.851)  (200.379)  (161.769)
Decile2  112.166  119.044  93.506
(230.161)  (285.357)  (197.679)
Decile 3  102.058  136.349  120.430
(176.515)  (263.939)  (240.703)
Decile 4  78.740  82.386  89.295
(248.272)  (281.863)  (277.294)
Decile 5  148.711  107.125  205.050
(434.210)  (208.313)  (597.605)
Decile 6 - 9  80.965  111.229  114.913
(191.337)  (278.584)  (196.906)
Decile 10  No participants in this decile
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5: Persons of participant households using different estimators
Groups  Nearest neighbor estimator  Nearest five estimator  Non-parametric estimator
Full sample  100.000  100.000  100.000
Ventile 1  21.525  10.207  8.671
Ventile 2  41.278  42.284  39.460
Decile 2  20.732  26.908  27.734
Decile 3  8.084  10.892  13.460
Decile 4  5.403  6.307  7.302
Decile 5  1.842  2.069  1.652
Decile 6 - 9  1.135  1.334  1.722
Decile 10  No participants in this decile
29Table 6: Net income gains from the program
Groups  % of  Persons  of  H'hold income  Net income  Net gain  as % of
participants  in  participant  of Trabajar  gain due to the  pre-intervention
ventile/decile  households  participants  program  income
Full sample  100.000  100.000  501.181  102.627  25.926
(364.632)  (247.433)
Ventile 1  6.070  10.207  299.102  108.543  74.830
(221.119)  (210.543)
Ventile  2  36.535  42. 284  369.194  83.351  24.746
(265.054)  (200.379)
Decile 2  26.700  26.908  548.789  119.044  26.566
(353.237)  (285.357)
Decile 3  12.601  10.892  685.413  136.349  23.056
(358.139)  (263.939)
Decile 4  11.833  6.307  543.680  82.386  13.483
(441.794)  (281.863)
Decile 5  3.496  2.069  749.443  107.125  14.975
(384.025)  (208.313)
Decile 6 - 9  2.766  1.334  879.382  111.229  11.469
(496.091)  (278.584)
Decile 10  No participants  in this decile
Notes: These  numbers  correspond  to the nearest  five estimator  reported  in Table  4. Standard
errors  in parentheses.
Table 7: Net income gains for female participants
Groups  % of  Persons  of  H'hold income  Net income  Net gain as % of
participants  in  participant  of Trabajar  gain  due to the  pre-intervention
ventile/decile  households  participants  program  income
Full sample  100.000  100.000  571.890  103.904  22.818
(382.580)  (277.340)
Ventile 1  3.289  5.645  351.300  158.240  82.298
(428.177)  (409.963)
Ventile  2  25.000  31.948  424.370  101.360  30.767
(320.742)  (281.681)
Decile 2  32.895  34.000  520.800  87.490  18.400
(286.501)  (202.641)
Decile  3  16.447  15.261  718.660  136.284  21.166
(493.045)  (420.507)
Decile  4  12.500  8.251  655.579  92.353  14.123
(322.183)  (196.851)
Decile  5  4.605  2.605  696.143  79.000  12.558
(224.638)  (126.926)
Decile 6-9  5.263  2.295  963.663  132.663  14.006
(473.150)  (248.887)
Decile 10  No participants  in this decile
Notes: These  numbers  correspond  to the nearest  five  estimator  for the sub-group  of female
participants.  Standard  errors  in parentheses.
30Table 8: Income gains for those 15-24 years of age
Groups  % of  Persons  of  H'hold income  Net income  Net gain as % of
participants  in  participant  of Trabajar  gain  due to the  pre-intervention
decile  households  participants  program  income
Full sample  100.000  100.000  618.789  125.241  25.592
(401.990)  (255.903)
Decile 1  30.214  37.012  434.619  121.500  35.287
(332.660)  (261.500)
Decile  2  31.567  34.431  636.060  143.657  28.629
(353.555)  (272.418)
Decile  3  16.234  14.776  738.666  133.560  19.921
(383.006)  (275.162)
Decile4  11.838  8.313  620.135  73.146  10.559
(378.544)  (169.706)
Decile 5  10.034  3.618  886.735  152.898  17.400
(422.0520  (262.636)
Decile 6 -9  3.495  1.850  1,069.600  102.142  9.550
(608.221)  (176.652)
Decile 10  No participants  in this decile
Notes: These  numbers  correspond  to the nearest  five  estimator  for the sub-group  of 15-24  year
participants.  Standard  errors in parentheses.
Table 9: Income gains for those 25-64 years of age
Groups  % of  Persons  of  H'hold income  Net income  Net gain as % of
participants  in  participant  of Trabajar  gain due to the  pre-intervention
decile  households  participants  program  income
Full sample  100.000  100.000  443.443  85.820  22.241
(328.253)  (231.032)
Bottom  5%  7.423  13.062  307.386  97.474  38.564
(251.260)  (221.489)
Next 5%  39.451  45.767  342.499  71.809  22.207
(252.305)  (205.962)
Decile 2  26.651  24.938  487.939  86.833  21.204
(251.477)  (180.047)
Decile 3  11.046  8.851  625.097  122.505  25.578
(395.1020  (334.238)
Decile  4  10.812  5.046  476.941  74.724  13.594
(410.221)  (271.968)
Decile 5  2.221  1.343  755.921  123.176  13.996
(561.663)  (331.995)
Decile  6-9  2.396  0.993  753.736  115.478  15.834
(437.869)  (224.021)
Decile 10  No participants  in this decile
Notes:  These  numbers  correspond  to the neares.  five estimator  for  the sub-group  of 25-64  year participants.
Standard  errors  in parentheses.
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